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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Elijah Z. Nuss asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion during his
jury trial, when it allowed a facility dog and its handler to accompany the alleged victim, L.W.,
during her testimony.

The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal

standards, because under the circumstances of this case the district court should have made
written findings that Mr. Nuss’ constitutional right to a fair trial would be unduly prejudiced if
the facility dog and its handler were allowed to sit with L.W. during her testimony. The presence
of the facility dog and its handler was prejudicial, and the district court failed to follow the steps
it had outlined to mitigate the prejudice.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State asserts Mr. Nuss has not demonstrated that the district
court abused its discretion by allowing the facility dog and the dog’s handler to sit near L.W.
during her testimony. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-10.) This Reply Brief is necessary to show the
State’s arguments are unavailing, because the State’s arguments fail to squarely address that
Mr. Nuss objected to the presence of the facility dog and its handler. Moreover, the State has not
met its burden of proving that the district court’s abuse of discretion is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Nuss’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the facility dog and its handler to
accompany L.W. during her testimony?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Facility Dog And Its Handler To
Accompany L.W. During Her Testimony

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nuss asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the facility dog

and its handler to accompany L.W. during her testimony.

The district court did not act

consistently with the applicable legal standards, because under the circumstances of this case the
district court should have made written findings that Mr. Nuss’ constitutional right to a fair trial
would be unduly prejudiced if the facility dog and its handler were allowed to sit with L.W.
during her testimony. The State has not met its burden of proving that the district court’s abuse
of discretion is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards,
Because The District Court Should Have Made Written Findings That Mr. Nuss’
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Would Be Unduly Prejudiced
Mr. Nuss asserts the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal

standards, because under the circumstances of this case the district court should have made
written findings that Mr. Nuss’ constitutional right to a fair trial would be unduly prejudiced if
the facility dog and its handler were allowed to sit with L.W. during her testimony.

See

I.C. § 19-3023(1). The presence of the facility dog and its handler was prejudicial, and the
district court failed to follow the steps it had outlined to mitigate the prejudice.
The State’s arguments to the contrary fail to squarely address that Mr. Nuss objected to
the presence of the facility dog and its handler. While the State acknowledges Mr. Nuss objected
to the presence of the facility dog and the dog’s handler (see Resp. Br., p.6), the State’s
arguments focus on the presence of the facility dog taken alone. For example, the State contends
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the district court “took the mitigating step of specifically instructing the jury that it was to
disregard the presence of the dog and not draw any inferences from its presence.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.) However, that jury instruction did not address the presence of the handler
during L.W.’s testimony. (See Non-Confidential Exs., p.40; Tr., p.128, Ls.3-18.) Further, the
district court did not explain the presence of the handler to the jury until the handler walked the
facility dog out of the courtroom. (See Tr., p.206, Ls.17-21.)
The State also contends that, because Mr. Nuss did not allege any case-specific factor that
would render the facility dog’s presence unconstitutional in the unique circumstances in this
case, and no such factors are evident from the record, Mr. Nuss has not demonstrated that the
district court erred. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) However, Mr. Nuss asserted before the district court
that the presence of the facility dog and its handler would be prejudicial in this particular case.
Mr. Nuss asserted the facility dog made L.W. “appear more vulnerable,” and was “prejudicial in
the eyes of the jury” because it gave L.W.’s testimony “more credence and emotionality.” (See
Tr., p.131, Ls.16-22.) With respect to the handler, Mr. Nuss reiterated his initial objection and
asserted, “another person is prejudicial to the case.” (See Tr., p.140, Ls.11-13.)
The State also cites to cases from other jurisdictions, where “the courts have concluded
that the trial court acted within its discretion to permit the facility dog and/or that the facility
dog’s presence did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)
But those cases from other jurisdictions, unlike the present case, largely do not appear to involve
both a facility dog and its handler accompanying witnesses during their testimony. For example,
in People v. Johnson, 889 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016), in the defendant’s trial, “a black
Labrador retriever named Mr. Weeber was permitted, without objection, to accompany the sixyear-old victim and the victim’s 10-year-old brother on the witness stand while they testified.”
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Id. at 521. Similarly, in People v. Tohom, 109 A.D.3d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), a “comfort
dog” accompanied the alleged victim during her testimony. See id. at 258-59.
Neither Johnson nor Tohom mention the presence of a handler alongside the facility dog
while the witnesses in those respective cases were testifying. See Johnson, 889 N.W.2d at 521;
Tohom, 109 A.D.3d at 258-59. Similarly, most of the other cases from other jurisdictions cited
by the State do not indicate a handler was present with the facility dogs at issue. See State v.
Devon D., 138 A.3d 849, 863-64 (Conn. 2016) (the facility dog sat near the witness while she
testified); State v. Dye, 309 P.3d 1192, 1195-96 (Wash. 2013) (the facility dog sat with the
witness during his testimony); State v. Reyes, 505 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016) (the
facility dog was at the witness’s feet during his testimony); State v. Hasenyager, 67 N.E.3d 132,
135 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (the facility dog accompanied the witness on the witness stand during
her testimony). Even in People v. Chenault, 227 Cal. App. 4th 1503 (Ct. App. 2014), which
discussed the facility dog’s handler the most out of the cases cited by the State, the handler was
to sit in a chair near the back door of the courtroom, not with the facility dog and the witness.
See id. at 1512-13.
Unlike in the cases cited by the State, in the present case both the facility dog and its
handler accompanied L.W. during her testimony, which prejudiced Mr. Nuss’ right to a fair trial.
Allowing the handler to accompany L.W. with the facility dog increased the prejudice to
Mr. Nuss. As explained in a passage from Tohom quoted by the State (see Resp. Br., p.9), “An
adult, especially one who can understand the entirety of the case, including its legal
underpinnings, may be seen by a jury to add credibility to the arguments of the plaintiff’s
witness.” See Tohom, 109 A.D.3d at 272-73 (quoting Marianne Dellinger, Using Dogs for
Emotional Support of Testifying Victims of Crime, 15 Animal L. 171, 186 (2009)). Because the
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cases from other jurisdictions cited by the State do not involve the presence of both a facility dog
and its handler, they ultimately do not support the State’s position with respect to this case.
The State’s arguments, because they fail to squarely address that Mr. Nuss objected to the
presence of the facility dog and its handler, are unavailing. The presence of the facility dog and
its handler was prejudicial, and the district court failed to follow the steps it had outlined to
mitigate the prejudice. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards, because under the circumstances of this case the district court should have made
written findings that Mr. Nuss’ constitutional right to a fair trial would be unduly prejudiced if
the facility dog and its handler were allowed to sit with L.W. during her testimony.

C.

The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving That The District Court’s Abuse Of
Discretion Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Nuss asserts the State has not met its burden of proving that the district court’s abuse

of discretion in allowing the facility dog and its handler to accompany L.W. during her
testimony, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227
(2010).
The State argues: “In this case, the touchstone issue for the jury was L.W.’s credibility.
The mere presence of a facility dog and dog handler with L.W. during her trial testimony did not
inform her credibility, or [Mr.] Nuss’s guilt or innocence. Therefore, any error was harmless.”
(Resp. Br., p.10.)
The State’s cursory argument does not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there
was no reasonable possibility that the district court’s abuse of discretion contributed to the
conviction. See State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Rather, considering the overall weakness of the State’s case (see App.
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Br., p.13), there was a reasonable possibility that allowing the facility dog and its handler to
accompany L.W. during her testimony contributed to the conviction. The district court’s failure
to follow its steps to mitigate the prejudice meant the district court’s jury instruction did not
cover what actually happened with the facility dog. (See Tr., p.128, Ls.3-18, p.206, Ls.17-21.)
Moreover, the jury instruction did not address the presence of the handler, who was sitting
behind L.W. throughout her testimony. (See Non-Confidential Exs. p.40; Tr., p.128, Ls.3-18.)
As suggested by Tohom, the handler could have been seen by the jury as adding to the credibility
of L.W.’s testimony. See Tohom, 109 A.D.3d at 272-73.
There is a reasonable possibility that having the facility dog and its handler sit with L.W.
during her testimony contributed to the conviction. The State has not met its burden of proving
that the district court’s abuse of discretion is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 227. Mr. Nuss’ judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the matter should be
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Nuss
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

7
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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